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I
INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court that
recognize that some governmental questions lie entirely within the discretion
of the Diet or the discretion of other political branches of government. Such
questions are subject to the most lenient judicial scrutiny or are found to lie
completely outside the scope of judicial review. In constitutional litigation
these questions are referred to as either "matters of legislative discretion" or
"political questions."'
The Court has recognized that the Diet has broad discretionary power to
enact legislation concerning crime and punishment, family relations,
elections, social welfare, the status of public employees, and economic
regulations. First, I will introduce some recent cases in which the Court has
applied the legislative discretion test, and then I will refer to some common
features of these cases. Next I will consider the constitutional limitations of
this test and comment on the appropriate relationship between the Diet and
the Court.
II
MATTERS OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS

During the past four decades, the Supreme Court has held that some
constitutional questions are matters of legislative discretion or are political
questions. Consequently, the Court has refrained from interfering in matters
relating to political decisions by government.
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University.
1. The legislative discretion test and the political question doctrine are not referred to in the
Constitution; they are creations of the Supreme Court. Comprehensive analyses of these issues
appear in Kobayashi, The Doctrineof PoliticalQuestions, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 321 (N. Ashibe
ed. 1987); Nonaka, The Theory of Legislative Discretion, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL

LITIGATION

ed. 1987); Tomatsu, The Theory of Legislative Discretion, in MODERN STATES AND
CONSTITUTIONS 187 (Association for Studying Modern Constitutions ed. 1983).

93 (N. Ashibe

THE PRINCIPLES OF

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

A.

[Vol. 53: No. I

A Case on Illegitimacy

The first case concerns the status of illegitimate children. 2 Under
Japanese family law, a child born out of wedlock is treated as an illegitimate
child and is forced into a disadvantaged position in society. Illegitimate
children are allowed to use only their mother's family name and enjoy
property rights differently from legitimate children. Japanese family law
recognizes, however, that illegitimate children can be legitimated through
voluntary acknowledgement by their father or through a court order. A child
can be legitimated both ways while the father is still alive, but if the father is
dead, the child can be legitimated only through a court order. The child's
claim must be brought before the court within three years of the father's
death.
This three-year rule was challenged in a Kyoto District Court case. In
1947, the plaintiff was born to a young couple who had a traditional wedding
ceremony in an old Shinto shrine in 1946 but who did not register their
marriage at the appropriate local government office. As a result, the plaintiff
was deemed illegitimate and was registered on his mother's record even
though the family lived together as an ordinary family. One year after the
plaintiff was born, his father died. In 1951, the plaintiff brought suit to be
declared legitimate. However, on the first day of the trial, both parties were
absent because the plaintiff's attorney was ill. Ordinarily, in such a case, the
lawyer would ask the trial judge to set a new trial date. In this case, however,
the lawyer failed to file such a motion, and, unfortunately, he died two months
after the date of the first trial.
The plaintiff and his mother failed to receive notice of their lawyer's
sudden death and the status of their pending case from their lawyer's family.
The plaintiff believed that his case was proceeding in court. In fact, his case
had already been dismissed by the court, in accordance with the Civil
Procedure Act, which provides that if a plaintiff or his agent is absent from a
trial and does not ask for a new trial within three months, the court may
dismiss the case. The court may infer that the plaintiff withdrew his claim
after three months' absence.
As soon as the plaintiff and his mother learned of their lawyer's death, they
again brought their case to court. However, the Kyoto District Court
dismissed the case, relying on the "within three years of the death of the
father" clause. The decision was sustained by the Osaka High Court. The
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the time limit violated
Articles 13 and 14 of the Japanese Constitution. The Supreme Court held
that the time limit was constitutional and that requirements for raising claims
for legitimization lay entirely within the legislature's discretion. The threeyear time limit provided certainty in the law of family relationships and, as
such, was within the legislature's responsibility. Since the Court resolved this
case in a short opinion, it has not attracted the attention of constitutional
2.

Ono v. Japan, 9 Minsh6i 1122 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 20, 1955).
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the case addressed a very important aspect of

A Patricide Case

Article 200 and section 2 of Article 205 of the Penal Code impose heavier
penalties for patricide and matricide, including accidental murders of fathers
or mothers, than for ordinary homicide and accidental death. 3 In 1950, the
Fukuoka District Court held that section 2 of Article 205 was an
unconstitutional violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 4 The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision, stating that:
The [district court] decision holds that although family relations can be considered in
weighing penalties, this is no reasonable basis to provide for inequality [of
punishment] therein by means of law. However, we find that if it is feudalistic and
anti-democratic, as the original judgment states, to emphasize the special moral
relationship of children and parents, and if, consequently, a law based on this
emphasis is unconstitutional, then it is also unconstitutional to take these
circumstances into consideration, in weighing penalties when rendering judgment.
Or, stated conversely, if one can take these circumstances into consideration
constitutionally, then it is also possible
constitutionally to go a step further and to
5
objectify them in the form of law.

In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of broad
legislative discretionary power to set crimes and punishments. The Supreme
Court held that the reasoning quoted above was a legitimate and reasonable
basis for the constitutionality of Article 200 and section 2 of Article 205, until
the heavier criminal penalties prescribed in Article 200 were finally found
unconstitutional in a 1973 patricide case. 6
C.

Salaried Workers' Income Tax Case

The income tax law provides for a deduction of costs in separating taxable
profits from gross profits in assessing income taxes. However, the law treats
salaried workers and nonsalaried workers differently in allowing the
deduction of costs. In the case of salaried workers, legally fixed costs may be
deducted, but nonsalaried workers may subtract only real costs. In extended
litigation, a salaried worker attacked this system as leading to unconstitutional
3. Article 200 provides that a "person, who kills his lineal ascendant or a lineal ascendant of his
spouse, shall be punished with death or penal servitude for life." Article 205 provides that
A person, who inflicts an injury upon the person of another and thereby causes the latter's
death, shall be punished with penal servitude for a limited period of not less than two years.
When the crime is committed against a lineal ascendant of the offender or of the spouse
thereof, the offender shall be punished with penal servitude for life or not less than three
years.
KEIH6 (PENAL CODE), arts. 200, 205.
4. 4 Keishu 2037 (The Fukuoka Patricide Case) (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 11, 1950) (reversing
decision of the Fukuoka District Court of January 9, 1950); J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN
JAPAN 129 (1964).
5. J. Maki, supra note 4, at 129.
6. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 KeishOi 265 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 4, 1973) (aff g 1 Keisai Gepp6 544
(Utsunomiya Dist. Ct.., May 29, 1969) and rev g 619 HanreiJih6 93 (Tokyo H. Ct., May 12, 1970));
Beer, Japan's ConstitutionalSystem and Its Judicial Interpretation, 17 LAw IN JAPAN 7. 36 (1984).
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inequalities. 7 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the system
on the ground that the authority to set tax policy was delegated to the
legislature. Thus, courts must defer to the legislative judgment on taxes
unless it is clearly unreasonable.
D.

Economic Regulation Cases

The Diet possesses especially broad discretionary power to regulate
economic activities under the public welfare clauses of Articles 22 and 29 of
the Constitution. In cases where economic regulations have been challenged
as unconstitutional, courts have repeatedly deferred to legislative judgment.
Thus, economic regulations have been subjected to the most lenient judicial
review, and almost all restrictions have been held constitutional.
Licensing is a popular form of economic regulation. Licenses issued by
local governments are required for businesses such as pharmacies, public
bathhouses, and markets. The government agency checks various conditions
specified by statute before issuing a license. As a condition for acquiring a
license, the licensee is required to establish a business at a certain distance
(for instance, 250 meters in the case of a public bathhouse) from similar
businesses operating in the neighborhood.
In 1955, the Supreme Court held such restrictions constitutional as
applied to public bathhouses. 8 The Court justified distance regulations as a
way to maintain high sanitary standards in public baths:
Public baths are welfare facilities of a highly public nature, indispensable to the daily
life of the majority of the people. Moreover, in the event that their establishment be

left to the will of the entrepreneur himself and necessary measures are not taken to
preserve their proper distribution or to prevent maldistribution and excessive
numbers, it is to be feared not only that such maldistribution may cause inconvenience
to many people who wish easy access to public baths daily but also that excessive
numbers thereof may lead to futile competition and have an unfavorable economic
effect on the enterprises, thereby giving rise to undesirable
consequences such as a
9
deterioration in the sanitary facilities of the bathhouses.

E.

Cases on Election Law

The Constitution provides for terms of office for members of the Diet,
universal adult suffrage, and secrecy of the ballot.' 0 Other matters pertaining
to elections, including the size of each legislative house, qualifications of Diet
members, boundaries of electoral districts, and voting procedures, are to be
fixed by law. "I
The Diet is regarded as possessing broad discretionary power in making
election rules. The Diet has established rules concerning qualifications of
voters and candidates, election district boundaries and apportionment of Diet
7.
8.

Oshima v. Hamaguchi, 39 Minshfi 247 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 27, 1985).
Shimizu v.Japan (Fukuoka bathhouse decision), 9 Keishfi 89 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,Jan. 1, 1955); J.
MAKI, supra note 4, at 295.
9. J. Maki, supra note 4, at 295-96.
10. 1947 CONST. arts. 15, 46, 47.
11. Id. arts. 43, 44.
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members among them, election campaigns, voting procedures, and petitions
against the validity of elections. Restrictions on election campaigns and
apportionments have repeatedly resulted in constitutional litigation
concerning whether these legislative decisions have violated freedom of
expression or equal protection under the law. Constitutional questions also
have been raised regarding voting procedures and restrictions on filing a
petition against the validity of an election.
In these cases, the Supreme Court confirmed that the power to determine
election rules, except those rules specified in the Constitution, lies entirely
within the discretion of the Diet. For instance, in a 1961 reapportionment
case,' 2 the Supreme Court stated that because the power to decide election
rules was delegated to the Diet, the apportionment of members of the Diet
among election districts was a matter of legislative policymaking, except in
cases of extreme disproportion. This reasoning has been applied in later
cases on reapportionment,' 3 and the same justification was cited by the
4
Supreme Court in a case involving a ban on canvassing.'
The 1950 Public Officials Election Act imposes various regulations on
election campaigns, such as prohibiting bribery and unfair forms of influence.
In addition to these prohibitions against corrupt practices that interfere with
the free expression of a voter's will, many regulatory limitations and
prohibitions have been imposed to ensure that election campaigns are
5
conducted fairly and to avoid the exercise of undue influence over voters.'
One restriction on election campaigns, Article 138, section 1, of the 1950
Election Act provides that no one may conduct a door-to-door canvass with
the intention of soliciting a vote for himself or another person or preventing
the voter from voting for another person. This provision has been challenged
many times as a violation of freedom of expression. The Supreme Court,
however, has repeatedly ruled that it is not contrary to freedom of expression,
despite some lower court rulings holding it unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court denied the claim against a general ban on door-to-door canvassing
because "whether or not canvassing shall be prohibited uniformly is a matter
of legislative discretion (or policymaking powers) which shall be conducted
from the point of preserving both freedom and fairness in elections, and then
courts should defer to the judgment decided within legislative discretionary
powers."16

In Japan, voters go to the polls in their constituencies on election day and
write the name of one of the candidates on a paper ballot and drop it into a
12. Koshiyama v. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n, 18 MinshfO 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 5,
1964).
13. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm'n, 30 Minsh5 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14,
1976).
14. Japan v. Yada, 35 Keishfi 205 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B., June 15, 1981).
15. The regulatory prohibitions and limitations included no campaigning before the specified
date authorized by the election board, limits on the number of campaign pamphlets, restrictions on
posters and poster displays, and prohibitions on canvassing at voter's houses. Public Officials
Election Act (Koshoko Senky6 H6), Law No. 100, 1950.
16. 35 Keishfi 205.
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sealed box. They must act for themselves unless they are blind or physically
handicapped, in which case they may vote by agent at the polls. They also
may vote at a specified place other than an ordinary polling station before the
election.
The 1950 Election Act provided another special arrangement for severely
handicapped persons and pregnant women who found it difficult to go to the
polling station by themselves; they were permitted to vote by mail. In 1952,
however, the Diet abolished voting by mail on the ground that many illegal
practices had occurred in the 1952 election of local government officials
because of abuses of this special arrangement. In a 1985 case' 7 denying a
claim that attacked the abolition of voting by mail, the Supreme Court held
that since the Constitution does not mandate the adoption of voting by mail,
the power to make rules pertaining to the method of voting was within the
discretionary powers of the Diet.
The Election Act also enables a voter or a defeated candidate to lodge a
petition against the validity of an election. These petitions are reviewed by
the court of appeals. If the court finds that illegal practices have been
committed in the election, and that the irregularities were likely to have
affected the result of the election, the court may hold the election void. I8 In
addition to this general provision, there is a special clause that authorizes the
court to void the election result if an election agent, the general campaign
manager of the candidate, or the person in charge of campaign spending is
guilty of election offenses, even if the candidate himself did not commit such
an offense. 19 In 1959, the election of one candidate to the local assembly was
annulled because his election agent was guilty of committing an election
offense. Both the lower court and the Supreme Court held this special
provision constitutional because the rule was designed to have elections
proceed fairly, based on the freely expressed will of voters, and without any
20
disturbance.
F.

A Case in Welfare Rights

The Child Support Allowance Law, for children supported only by a
mother, contains a section that prohibits a child support allowance if a mother
receives another kind of public allowance of her own. A blind mother
divorced from her husband applied for the child support allowance but was
denied because she already received her own public allowance. In the 1982
Horiki case, 2 1 in which this law was held constitutional, the Supreme Court
17.
18.

Sato v. Japan, 39 Minshfi 1512 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Nov. 21, 1985).
Public Officials Election Act, Law No. 100, 1950, art. 205. Even if the court finds that the

irregularities were present at the election, it may determine that the result ought to stand since they
were unlikely to have affected the result.

19. Id. arts. 251-52.
20. 16 Minsh5 537 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 17, 1962).
21. Horiki v. Governor of Hyogo Prefecture, 36 Minshfl 1235 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 7, 1982);
Beer, supra note 6, at 39.
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stated that arrangements for payment of various public allowances in the
interest of fairness lay within legislative discretion.
G.

Political Question Cases

Finally, I would like to comment on cases in which the Supreme Court
22
applied the political question doctrine per se. In the 1959 Sunakawa case
the Supreme Court said that
the Security Treaty must be regarded as having a highly political nature which
possesses an extremely important relation to the basis of the existence of our country
as a sovereign nation. There are not a few points in which a legal decision as to the
unconstitutionality of its content is simply the other side of the coin of the political or
discretionary decision of the cabinet which concluded the treaty, or of the National
Diet, which gave its consent to it. Consequently, a legal decision as to
unconstitutionality has a character which, as a matter of principle, is not adaptable to
review by a judicial function; accordingly, it falls outside the right of judicial23review by
the courts, unless there is clearly obvious unconstitutionality or invalidity.

In a 1960 case concerning the power of the Cabinet to dissolve the House
of Representatives, 2 4 the Supreme Court held that decisions concerning a
fundamental governmental action with a highly political character should not
be made by the judiciary. Instead, the political branches of government,
which are accountable to the people directly, or finally the people themselves
should make these decisions, even if such decisions raise legal issues. The
validity of the dissolution of the House of Representatives by the Cabinet was
a political question. Although the government has repeatedly argued that the
political question doctrine should apply in reapportionment cases, the
Supreme Court has continually denied its claims. 25 The doctrine has also
been applied in some lower court cases concerning Article 9 of the
Constitution, 26 although the Sapporo District Court did not apply it in the
Naganuma case, 2 7 which dealt with the validity of the Self-Defense Forces.
Today, courts prefer to apply the legislative discretion doctrine rather than
the political question doctrine when they intend to avoid constitutional
adjudication or to refrain from interfering with decisions of the political
branches of government. According to the courts' reasoning, under the
legislative discretion test, courts refrain from interference with legislative
judgment but retain the power to settle constitutional questions. If courts
apply the political question doctrine, however, they may have to refrain
completely from determining constitutional questions that arise in those
22. Sakata v. Japan (The Sunakawa Case), 13 Keishi 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959); J.
MAKI, supra note 4, at 298.
23. J. MAKI, supra note 4, at 305-06.
24. Tomabeji v. Japan, 14 Minsh5 1206 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 8, 1960).
25. See supra notes 12, 13. In these reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court applied the
legislative discretion test, not the political question test.
26. Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry v. Ito, 36 Minshii 1679 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Sept. 9, 1982)

(affg 27 Gy6han 1175 (Sapporo H. Ct., Aug. 5, 1976) and revk 712 HanreiJih6 24 (Sapporo Dist.
Ct., Sept. 7, 1973)); Kobayashi, supra note 1, at 324.
27. 712 HanreiJih6 24.
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cases, and the political departments or the people themselves may have to
make judgments on questions of constitutionality.
III
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES IN WHICH MATTERS OF LEGISLATIVE
DISCRETION HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED

A.

Rules Based upon Presumption

The preceding brief survey of cases involving legislative discretion and
political questions illustrates how the Supreme Court has upheld various
legislative judgments as constitutionally reasonable actions within the
discretionary powers delegated by the Constitution. It is important to
question, however, what the Supreme Court has actually authorized through
its deference to the legislative discretion or political question doctrines. What
kind of constitutional rule in adjudication was established as a result of these
decisions? In this section, I shall explain the common features of these cases.
One common characteristic is that all the cases are concerned with
generalized rules based on presumed facts.
1. The 1955 Case on Illegitimate Children. The innocent child in the 1955
case 2 8 was clearly a victim of the Civil Procedure Act and the Family Law. The
procedural rule under which the plaintiff's case was dismissed is based on a
legislative finding. The law presumes from the plaintiff's three-month
absence without notice that the plaintiff no longer intends to continue his
case. This presumption is not proven, and it is not true for all plaintiffs. If
courts apply this rule absolutely to all parties, without providing them an
opportunity to be heard, some plaintiffs will have their cases dismissed
unreasonably, as in this case.
Second, the clause "within three years after the father's death" in the
Family Law is also based on a presumed fact. There is a presumption under
the provision that it is difficult to prove a father-child relationship three years
after a father's death. It is also presumed that allowing an illegitimate child's
claims to be raised more than three years after the father's death will obstruct
certainty in the law of family relations. Neither of these presumptions is true
in all cases. It is unreasonable to apply this clause mechanically to cases in
which the father-child relationship is very clear.
2. The PatricideCase. The law on patricide has been justified as supporting
moral values between children and parents. Patricide or matricide has been
regarded as an offense that should be punished heavily because these offenses
result from a child's violation of moral rules. A child has a moral obligation to
respect parents and to repay them for their kindness. This moral obligation is
quite different from the moral obligation of parents to children. Thus, the
violation of a moral obligation by a child should be subject to heavier public
28.

9 Minshfi 1122.
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blame than the violation of one by a parent. Imposing a heavier punishment
for patricide than for other murders reflects the different quality of moral
obligation that exists between parents and children than between nonfamily
members.
The presumption here is that parents abide by high moral standards, not
only in physically caring for the child, but also in teaching the high moral and
legal standards of human society. If conflicts occur between a child and a
parent resulting in the murder of a parent, the child should always be held
responsible for the violation of a moral obligation.
The presumptions that support this moral rule are that parents always
abide by high parental moral standards and, conversely, that a child who
murders his parents is always bad. These presumptions are not a proven
social fact. As the Supreme Court recognized in the 1973 patricide case, 29 the
violation of moral obligations by a child does not always deserve severe public
blame and criminal punishment. The Court reached this conclusion from
statistical data on punishment in patricide cases showing that, in most
patricide cases, courts gave very lenient sentences to children who acted
because of blameworthy conduct by their parents. Child abuse by parents
preceding patricide or matricide was found to be a significant cause driving
children to kill their parents. Thus, the behavior of parents is not always
consistent with the presumed fact underlying the patricide law.
3. The 1985 Income Tax Case. In the salaried worker's income tax case, 30 the
rule on cost deductions differentiated salaried workers from nonsalaried
workers. This rule presumes that the costs that are necessary for making
profits are the same for all salaried workers, without exception. This fact is
not proven. Clearly, the cost of producing taxable income differs depending
on the type of work done by salaried workers.
4. Cases in Economic Regulation. When the "distance between bathhouses"
regulation was held constitutional in the 1955 Fukuoka bathhouse case, 3 ' the
judicial deference toward the legislative findings with regard to the distance
was widely criticized by many commentators 3 2 because the facts that were
asserted in the Diet, and found by the Court, were not true for all bathhouses.
Free competition between businesses does not deteriorate the sanitary
conditions of public bathhouses in all circumstances.
This defect in reasoning was recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1975
pharmacy case.3 3 Pharmacies were subjected to government licensing
regulations, which included a distance requirement. The regulation on
distance was justified by the same legislative reasoning as in the bathhouse
29.
30.
31.
32.
HANREI
33.

27 Keishfi 265.
39 MinshfO 247.
9 Keishfu 89.
As a recent comment on this case, see Yamashita, 100 Selected ConstitutionalDecisions, 1 KENP6
HYAKUSEN 150 (N. Ashibe & K. Takahashi eds. 1988).
Umehara v. Japan, 29 Minshfi 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975).
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case: Free competition invites unfavorable economic effects upon enterprises
and results in the deterioration of medicine. This time the Supreme Court
was not persuaded by this reasoning and held that the distance regulation was
an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of occupation guaranteed by
Article 22 of the Constitution. The "free competition-unfavorable economic
effect-deterioration of medicine" justification was based on a presumption
that the court found to be an unreasonable judgment contrary to proven fact.
This judicial reasoning was not applied in the 1972 market case 3 4 and the
1989 public bathhouse3 5 case because the Court found a reasonable
legislative finding supporting the standard for distance regulations on these
businesses. In the 1972 market case, an applicant for a new market in an
Osaka neighborhood was not licensed by the Governor of Osaka although a
competitor operating in this neighborhood welcomed the applicant. The
Supreme Court recognized that regulating business activities is a matter of
legislative discretion and that the distance regulation was reasonable because
it protected a market operating with weak capital. The regulation prevented
an old market's bankruptcy by placing limits on free competition. Reading
the judicial factfinding in the context of modern marketing situations, the
presumption in this legislative determination becomes clear. Although the
same distance regulation was not imposed on a nearby supermarket, the
cumulative effects of new markets could cause the bankruptcy of the old
market.
5.

The Cases on Election Rules.

There are many presumptions among the

legislative findings used to justify rules regulating elections. For example, the
clause banning canvassing has been upheld by the Supreme Court on a
number of occasions as a constitutionally permissible rule, because it is
designed to prevent such election offenses as bribery, threats, and other
unfair influences on voters. 36 Thus, the legislature presumes that door-todoor canvassing is a cause of bribery and other unfair election practices, and
is a disturbance in private life by unwelcomed visitors. However, these facts
are not true for all voters. For some, canvassing is a welcome and convenient
source of information on candidates, even if the same action is cumbersome
for others.
When the legislature abolished the vote by mail for physically handicapped
persons, and when it adopted a petition system for challenging an election's
validity because of a campaign manager's election practice violations, it relied
upon a number of presumptions. Voting by mail is not a cause of unfair
election practices for all voters in all situations. This voting method is truly
necessary for some disabled persons. Similarly, nullifying the election of a
candidate when his or her general campaign manager is sentenced for an
election practice offense presumes that a candidate knows every action of the
34.
35.
36.

Marushin Sangyo Co., Ltd. v. Japan, 26 Keish5i 586 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 22, 1972).
Kitagawa v. Japan, 43 Keishfi 1 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B., Jan. 20, 1989).
See Beer, supra note 6, at 34.
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campaign manager or that the manager is engaging in illegal acts at the
direction of the candidate. Clearly, this is not always the case.
6. The Horiki Case. In the Horiki case, the Court based its opinion, in part,
on presumed facts. In justifying a clause in the Child Support Allowance Act
that disqualifies mothers who are paid their own public allowance from
receiving a child support allowance, the Supreme Court stated that "it is not
always true that double handicaps need double public allowances and triple
handicaps need triple public allowances." 3 7 Whether or not this is true
depends on the particular circumstances that each party faces. Thus, the
Court's holding based on presumed facts is insufficient justification for the
constitutionality of this rule.
B.

Categorical Decisionmaking

A second feature of the "legislative discretion" test is that it requires
decisionmakers or judges to make a categorical decision. In categorical
decisionmaking, the only task judges have is to find whether the
predetermined factors that constitute the rule exist in a particular case. Thus,
as a result of recognizing that some rules are matters of "legislative
discretion," the Supreme Court rejects the need for individualized
decisionmaking in each case.
The legislative discretion theory stresses certainty in the law and
consistency in decisionmaking.3 8 To serve these values, certain clear rules
need to be established. Although general rules applied uniformly often create
inequitable results, the legislative discretion test allows these situations to
exist in order to further the values of certainty and consistency in law.
For example, these considerations were predominant in cases concerning
the rights of public employees in the 1970s, 3 9 in which the Supreme Court
shifted from individualized decisionmaking to categorical decisionmaking.
The National Public Employee Law and the Local Public Employee Law,
examples of general rules made by the Diet, withheld the right to strike and
banned political activities by public employees. These statutes absolutely
prohibited public employees from striking. There were no exceptions, and
persons who incite strikes were subject to severe criminal penalties.
Regarding the general ban on strikes for public employees, the Supreme
Court in the 1960s adopted a quite different approach than in other fields. In
cases involving the Tokyo Central Post Office, 40 Tokyo Teachers Union, 4 1 and
37. 36 MinshQi at 1240.
38. Capowski, The Appropriateness and Design of CategoricalDecision-Making Systems, 48 ALB. L. REV.
951 (1984).
39. Beer, supra note 6, at 23-26.
40. Toyama v. Japan (The Tokyo Central Post Office Case), 20 KeishO 901 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct.
26, 1966) (translated in H. ITOH & L. BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 85 (1978)).
41. Hasegawa v. Japan, 23 KeishO 305 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 2, 1969).
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Sendai Judiciary Workers Union, 42 the Supreme Court attempted to tailor
individualized decisions by calling for "distinctions between types of public
work, between legitimate labor dispute activities and political activities,
between degrees of illegality and public inconvenience, and between mild
sanctions and criminal penalties that are disproportionate for worker failure
to perform contractual obligations. " 4 3 The Supreme Court stressed that
penalties should differ depending on the types of public work and degrees of
public inconvenience caused by labor strikes. However, in the 1973 AllJapan
Agriculture Forestry Workers Union case, 4 4 the Supreme Court abandoned
this approach and shifted to "a policy of comprehensive restriction of public
worker rights based on a literal interpretation of statutes and disregard of the
substantial diversity among types of public employees in Japan." 45 Thus, in
this field, the Supreme Court also has rejected individualized decisionmaking
and returned to categorical decisionmaking. With this 1973 case, 4 6 moreover,
the Supreme Court not only adopted a categorical decisionmaking approach
in public employee cases but also explicitly rebuked the individualized
approach because it was based on vague standards not mandated by statute
and because it violated the due process clause of Article 31 of the
Constitution.
The same categorical approach was taken by the Supreme Court in the
1974 Sarufutsu case, 4 7 in which a legal restriction on the political activity of
public employees was attacked as a violation of freedom of expression. The

Supreme Court held the restrictive clause constitutional even though it
applied to political activities that "[did] not impair performance of duty, [and
were] engaged in away from official premises while off duty, and [were]
48
performed by non-managerial service employees in a peaceful manner."
It is important to note the effects produced by the legislative discretion
test. The test not only favors categorical decisionmaking over individualized
decisionmaking, but it also allows categorical decisionmaking to be based on
rules that are supported by presumed facts. This situation, as previously
discussed, has often resulted in an imprecise judgment for each party.
An illegitimate child who could easily prove a relationship with his father
was forced to remain in an illegitimate status because the "within three years"
rule was supported by an irrebuttable presumption about the child-father
relationship. In the patricide case, there was an inconsistency between the
presumed facts and the reality of parental behavior. If a rule based on social
myths about parents is applied to parents who do not conform to the
42. Japan v. Sakane (TheJudiciary Workers Case), 23 Keishu 685 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 2, 1969)
(translated in H. ITOH & L. BEER, supra note 40, at 103).
43. Beer, supra note 6, at 24-25.
44. Tsurozomo v.Japan, 27 Keishui 547 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 25, 1973); Beer, supra note 6, at 23.
45. Beer, supra note 6, at 25.
46. 27 Keishii 547.
47. Japan v. Osawa (The Sarufutsu Case), 28 Keishfi 393 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 6, 1974) (revg
514 Hanrei Jih6 20 (Asahikawa Dist. Ct., Mar. 23, 1968) and 560 Hanrei Jih6 30 (Sapporo H. Ct.,
June 24, 1969)); Beer, supra note 6, at 26.
48. See Beer, supra note 6, at 27.

Page 181: Winter 1990]

POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION

193

presumed fact, such parents are treated favorably only because they are
"parents." Such an outcome results in unfair legal treatment and is contrary
to the principle of individualized criminal punishment. There is no place for
"guilt by association" 4 9 in the criminal law.
Using the patricide case as an example, the unfair results occur because
the patricide law is based on presumed facts. The Diet based a criminal law
on the concept of "parent and child," a group concept made in society, like
race, sex, family origin, and social status. We are likely to use such concepts
in making general rules. Under these general rules, the only task that
decisionmakers have is to find whether predetermined factors are present. In
a patricide case, if the decisionmaker finds that the victims are parents and the
defendant is their child, the result will be reached mechanically,
notwithstanding the legitimacy of the result. In this situation, the factors that
are taken into account in making the decision are both predetermined and
limited. There is no room for judges to consider other factors in order to
reach a fair result.
In the 1973 patricide case, the Supreme Court held that the heavier
penalty for killing a lineal ascendant than for ordinary murder was
unconstitutional. However, the reason for the penalty's unconstitutional
status should have been that the application of a rule supported by a
presumed fact and resulting in individual injustice is not constitutionally
permitted. The general rule on patricide should be abolished, and the
general rules for murder should be applied to patricide cases. Article 199 of
the criminal law concerning murder enables judges to take the actual
situations of victims and suspects into account and fashion a fair judgment for
individual defendants.
In the 1985 salaried workers' income tax case, 50 the Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional a general rule on the cost deduction system in
income tax. Once this general rule was held constitutional, judges were not
allowed to make individualized decisions on costs paid by a particular
taxpayer in a salaried worker's case. Nor were they allowed to consider the
various circumstances of salaried workers. The only thing that judges could
do was to find out whether a given taxpayer was a salaried worker. On this
basis, some salaried workers were forced to pay more income tax than
nonsalaried workers on the same amount of income.
IV
LIMITATION OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION

A survey of cases in which the Supreme Court applied the legislative
discretion test shows that there should be a constitutional limitation on
discretionary judgments by the Diet. In considering to what extent legislative
49. Soifer, Guilt by Association, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 877 (L. Levy, K.
Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986).
50. 39 Minsh6i 247.
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discretion should be limited by the judiciary, it is necessary to comment on
the relationship between parliamentary democracy and judicial review.
A.

Majority Rule and Abuse of Power

The Constitution adopted the principle of government by laws that are
adopted by the representatives of the people. Under this system, the people
govern themselves through their representatives; it is the pattern of selfgovernment adopted in Japan. Since the governing power exercised by the
Diet is derived from the people, the laws that are made by the Diet control not
only the executive and the judiciary but also the people themselves. The Diet,
as the supreme organ of state power, possesses enormous powers, including
lawmaking, controlling finance and the activities of the executive, impeaching
judges, and taking the initiative in the constitutional amendment process.
The authority of the Diet extends to almost all matters pertaining to
government-from national security to keeping and promoting the order,
morals, health, safety, and general welfare of society. The Diet also may
exercise broad discretionary powers on any question faced in society and has
power to regulate by law any aspect of daily life. The emperor, the Cabinet,
administrative agencies, the judiciary, and local public entities must perform
their functions within the boundaries established by law. The Diet has, in
truth, large powers; it is, indeed, the "supreme organ of state power." 5 ' In
this sense, the supremacy of the Diet is recognized by the Constitution.
The system of government through the Diet is based on a very optimistic
view of human nature. There is an assumption that government through the
Diet is a government of "men who possess most wisdom to discern and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society." 5 2 The Constitution
defines Diet members as "representatives of all the people ' ' 5 3 and "the
servants of the whole community," 54 not as representatives or agents of
constituencies or servants of any particular groups. Diet members are
expected to possess exceptionally high moral standards, discernment, fairmindedness, and a sense of balance required for statesmen as the
representatives of all the people. They are guardians of liberty and equality
and promoters of the general welfare. Under a government consisting of such
statesmen, the trust of the people will not be betrayed. Harmonious society,
where all people can attain happiness, is not just a vision but a reality. In such
a society, governmental power need not be restrained because abuse of power
is not expected to occur under this government.
The Constitution reflects not only this idealistic image of government
based on an optimistic view of human nature, but it also expresses a
51.
1947 CONST. art. 41; Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal System: Current
Development, 37 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 89 (1988).
52. Tarcov, Popular Sovereignty (in Democratic Political Theory), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 49, at 1426.
53. 1947 CONST. art. 43.
54. Id. art. 15(2).
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pessimistic view of human nature by implying negative attitudes toward
governmental actions produced through unreasonable, passionate, hysterical,
undeliberative, and selfish deeds of human beings. The Constitution refers to
"horrors of war through the action of government," 55 "tyranny and slavery,
oppression and intolerance, ' 5 6 "fear and want," 57 "abuse of freedoms and
rights," 5 8a "discrimination in political, economic or social relations," 59 and
"the illegal act of any public officials." '60 This pessimistic view of human
nature is derived from the historical facts that gave rise to the Bill of Rights,
Chapter 3 in the Japanese Constitution. Each clause of Chapter 3 reflects
inhuman deeds in the past, and the possibility of their recurrence in the
future, unless the ideal government presumed in the Constitution is
61
maintained by "the constant endeavour of the people."
If such formidable and inhuman actions occur, even under democratic
government, it is because the majority group abuses the governing power
entrusted to it by the whole people. Thus, the Constitution adopted such
features as separation of powers, judicial review, and impeachment to prevent
the tyranny of the majority. Judicial review, established by Article 81 of the
Constitution, is based on this pessimistic view of human nature. The
appropriate role of courts, especially the Supreme Court, is to prevent the
conscious or unconscious abuse of power by the majority in the Diet.
Theoretically, under the government created by the Constitution, violations
of human rights caused by the abuse of majority rule will not occur because
the abuse of power and the violation of human rights are contradictory to selfgovernment by the people, even though it is carried out through the people's
representatives. Since self-government was established after "the age old
struggle of men to be free," 62 the abuse of power is expected to be restrained
by the majority of the people. In actuality, however, the majority of the
people cannot always be trusted. This fact suggests that the people should
not trust themselves, even under democratic government. Thus, an
instrument is necessary to check the abuse of majority power-the abuse of
power by ourselves. Such a pessimistic perspective leads us to expect an
active judicial role in the governing process. The problem is, however, how
shall the courts be active?
B.

Judicial Attitude Toward Arbitrariness

The discretionary powers that the Diet possesses are constitutionally
limited. Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution mandate that a policy made by
the Diet should be compatible with the fundamental rule that each person has
55.
56.

Id. preface.
Id.

57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
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a "claim to equal respect as an individual." 63 Thus, in order to satisfy this
requirement, rules should enable judges to reach an equitable result.
According to this standard, many general rules made by the Diet are
constitutionally suspect. If the Diet makes a general rule that judges shall
make only categorical decisions, the Diet has probably abused, either
consciously or unconsciously, its discretionary power. In the 1985 salaried
workers' income tax case, as a result of the rule that directed judges not to
make individual judgments on costs, some salaried workers were subjected to
inequitable results without having an opportunity to rebut the presumed fact
underlying the rule. The Constitution does not permit the Diet to use its
legislative power in such an arbitrary way. Such an exercise of power should
be declared void as an abuse of legislative discretion. The Diet should enact
laws that enable administrators and judges to render a precise and fair
decision or judgment for an individual party.
During the past forty years, the Supreme Court has expressed at least
three different approaches toward legal rules that force individuals to accept
unfair legal treatment. The first approach was that if the Supreme Court
found an arbitrary element in the rule, it declared the rule unconstitutional.
In the 1975 pharmacy case, 64 for example, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Diet had authority to regulate economic activities by balancing the
freedom of occupation with public welfare, considering such factors as the
purpose, necessity, and contents of regulation, the freedom of occupation,
and the degree of restrictions on freedom. The Court concluded that it
should defer to legislative judgment and discretion only so far as was
reasonable. Applying this standard, however, the Court found that the
"distance between pharmacies" regulation was not reasonable because the
justification set forth by the Diet of preventing the deterioration of medicine
was not compatible with the common sense of the people who were
accustomed to prescription drugs in society and who knew that defects
occurred in the drugs' manufacture and storage. Since pharmacies are just
retail shops, the deterioration of medicine has no reasonable relationship to
the distance regulation.
The second judicial approach toward legislative discretionary power is that
the courts try to mitigate disadvantageous effects caused by a general rule.
This is done by individualized decisionmaking through the interpretation of
rules. An example can be found in a 1980 case in which the Kyoto District
Court again faced the issue of the status of an illegitimate child who sought to
be legitimated. The plaintiff took his case to court more than three years after
his father's death. However, this time the court did not dismiss the claim and
delivered a decision for the plaintiff. The father-child relationship was
recognized even though more than three years had passed since the father's
death. The Supreme Court subsequently overruled the decision of the Osaka
Court of Appeals, which had applied the 1955 Supreme Court case as a
63.

R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 13 (1978).

64.

29 Minshfi 572.
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precedent. In reversing the decision of the Osaka Court of Appeals, which
had applied the "within three years" clause strictly to this case, the Supreme
Court took the following unusual circumstances of the case into account in
order to mitigate the effects that would have been produced by strict
65
application of the clause.
In 1975, the child's parents celebrated a wedding and signed their names
on the official paper along with signatures of witnesses for registration.
Unfortunately, they did not register their marriage at the local government's
office immediately after the wedding ceremony. The following year, the
plaintiff was born. The child's father, however, had left home without notice
before the child's birth. Nobody knew where the baby's father was and
whether he was alive when the baby was born. Since his mother had both the
marriage and birth registered at the same time, the child was registered as a
legitimate child. After these registrations were completed, it was learned that
the baby's father had died three months prior to the baby's birth. As a result,
the status of this child was changed legally from legitimate to illegitimate.
When the child raised his claim to be recognized as the legitimate child of the
deceased man, more than three years had passed from the date of his father's
death. Legally, his claim should not have been accepted by the courts because
it had not satisfied the "within three years" requirement for such a claim.
In making a judgment about the three-year requirement, however, the
Supreme Court held that, in this case, the beginning date for the three years'
limitation should be the date when the plaintiff was notified of his father's
death, not the date of his father's death. The Court found that to ask the
plaintiff to raise a claim within three years after his father's death was to ask
the impossible because the child had enjoyed the status of a legitimate child
until he was notified of his father's death. Such a fair result was reached by an
individualized judgment, based on the equity power of the court. Thus, the
Court restricted legislative discretion indirectly, by preventing a general rule
made by legislative discretion from reaching an unreasonable and unfair
effect.
The third approach taken by the Supreme Court toward legislative
discretion is that the Court will hold rules constitutional even if it finds some
degree of arbitrariness in them. In the 1955 case involving an illegitimate
child, all courts denied an individualized decision although they felt that the
general rule inflicted an unfair effect on an innocent child.
The same approach was taken in the 1974 and 1981 cases banning,
respectively, certain kinds of political activity and voter canvassing. In these
cases the Supreme Court justified some degree of unconstitutionality in the
rules by a kind of cost-benefit analysis. In justifying a political activity ban for
public employees the Supreme Court said:
Although freedom of expression is limited by this ban, interests which are gained by it
(it preserves the political neutrality of public employees and the peoples' trust in

65.
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unbiased administrative action) are far more
important than interests lost by this ban.
66
Thus, this ban is not disproportionate.

The same justification was applied in the 1981 canvassing ban case to
67
authorize some degree of arbitrariness in the rule.

By balancing interests, the Supreme Court has tolerated some degree of
arbitrary judgment for individual persons on the pretext of implementing a

more valuable purpose. This kind of reasoning has aroused a sense of
unfairness in defeated parties because the Supreme Court has not only
abandoned its role of remedying unfair treatment, but it also has not required
the Diet to act promptly and to base its actions on the principle of equity.
Thus, an inequitable treatment or imprecise judgment for a particular party
has been left without a remedy through any governmental organ.
V
CONCLUSION

Most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the legislative
discretion doctrine illustrate the third type ofjudicial approach. The first and
the second mitigating approaches are exceptions in this field. In this sense,
the legislative discretion doctrine plays almost the same role as the political
question doctrine in constitutional litigation. The Supreme Court is
extremely reluctant to interfere with matters of legislative discretion except
when legislative judgment is grossly unreasonable. This judicial attitude has
been criticized as a symptom of nonactivism by the Japanese Supreme
Court. 68 Many commentators urge the Supreme Court to take a more active

role in implementing constitutional values such as "peace," "freedom,"
"equality," and "wholesome and cultured living." These comments are very
understandable in the context of the contemporary government process in
Japan.
However, under the constitutional government in which the Diet has been
delegated many important governing powers by the people, another
allocation of responsibility between the Diet and the Supreme Court is
possible. Perhaps the Diet should exercise its equity power more actively.
This action should be done even if the Supreme Court refrains from declaring
rules unconstitutional. Under the Japanese Constitution, the equity power is
given to the Diet, not to the Court. Because the Diet consists of
representatives of all the people and servants of the whole community, it is
entrusted with the equity power. The Supreme Court can exercise the equity
power based on delegation, in various forms, from the Diet. The equity
power is usually delegated by means of an exception clause to a general law.
The Diet has exercised its equitable power in this form to remedy the
defects that a general law might bring about. A good example can be found in
66.
67.
68.
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the election law. Under the law governing voting in 1950, voters had to go to
the polling stations by themselves on polling day and write a candidate's name
on the ballot paper by themselves. If this was the only rule concerning the
method of voting and was applied uniformly to all voters without taking a
voter's physical condition into account, many handicapped voters would be
forced to give up a chance to participate in the political process. But these
unreasonable and unfair results were avoided by such exception clauses as
absentee voting, voting by mail, and voting by proxy. These exception
clauses are products of the legislature exercising its equity power. The Diet
should make similar rules to implement the fundamental constitutional
requirement of "equal respect as individuals," even if courts do not require
the Diet to do so. The Diet should be the agent of equity, the supreme
guardian of values that the Constitution protects.
In the field of legislative discretion, the courts should awaken the Diet, as
"the highest organ of state power," to its duties. In order to play this role, the
Supreme Court should indicate arbitrary aspects of laws either by obiter dicta
or by advisory opinions and urge the Diet to enact more equitable laws, even
if it refrains from holding a law unconstitutional, as it did in the 1983
reapportionment case. 6 9 The active authorization of rules by the Supreme
Court based on cost-benefit analysis should be avoided, since it not only has a
negative effect on the legal action of the Diet (as happened after the Horiki
decision), 70 but also because it undermines the image of the Court as a public
forum for fairness and justice. Whenever the Supreme Court finds
arbitrariness and injustice in laws, it should advise the Diet to take prompt
action to rectify them.

When the Supreme Court applies the legislative discretion or political
question doctrines, it should not be the end of the constitutional process but a
reaffirmation of it. Here, too, the Diet should realize its accountability to all
the people and to the whole community.

69. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Comm'n v. Koshiyama, 37 Minshfi 1243 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov.
7, 1983).
70. The Diet abolished a clause alleged to be unconstitutional in the Horiki case. It reestablished
the clause after the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality.

